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Global discourse bemoaning the subversion of truth may be reinforcing falsity on what
the truth is. The history of Western philosophy’s approaches to epistemology can
illustrate this.
Epistemology is often defined as the study of how we know what we know. It usually
subsumes arriving at what we know through a belief we believe is true and we can
justify as true. Those who develop and implement disinformation and deception
operations against us target how and what we justify as true—justification being
something we perform both consciously and out of awareness.
Global discourse bemoaning the subversion of truth is founded on the presumption that
there are agreed-upon justifications for what we should know. Not ‘should’ in the sense
of morally right or wrong but of being the case or not. However, the history of Western
epistemology suggests otherwise.
In correspondence approaches to knowledge, we assume we can come up with
something inside us—usually called the ‘mind’—that is exactly the case for something
outside of us. We then believe we know this. Illusions, delusions, and hallucinations
suggest that we may not know what we think we know inside or out.
In coherence approaches to knowledge, we believe we know something when it fits into
what else we know. But anomalies violating scientific theories and information
supporting everyday theories that are later violated—e. g., a loyal spouse becoming
disloyal—suggest coherence might be incoherent.
In pragmatic approaches to knowledge, we believe we know something when our world
changes in a manner we believe must follow from some characteristic of that
something. But some days the snack dispenser doesn’t work and after many
confirmations of food and safety the turkey becomes Thanksgiving dinner.
Epistemology contains further complexities. Sometimes we believe we know what
things mean even if they don’t seem to refer to anything at all in the world. As Sir
Bertrand Russell has shown us, we know what ‘the present King of France is bald’
means, even if there isn’t one. Moreover, we seem to live within epistemological
hierarchies—a combination of criteria we use to come to believe we know something.
These hierarchies usually include belief in knowledge through just believing in it (faith),
through some higher authority (secular or sacred), through intuition, through our senses,
and through systematic sensing via experiments that seem to replicate or falsify what
we believe we know. In addition, our approaches to knowledge seem to change in
different situations, different stages of our lives, and for humanity different historical
eras.
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Western epistemology doesn’t demand skepticism, i. e., that we can’t know anything—
even if it has been attributed to Gorgias the Skeptic that nothing exists; if it does, we
can’t know it; and if we can know it, it can’t be communicated. It does strongly suggest
we should not believe that we know that some incontrovertible truth is under attack.
Instead, the truth is up for grabs, always has been, always will. Yes, some truths are
easier to arrive at, and we may choose to believe what we don’t know or can’t justify
knowing. In fact, being a free and decent person may denote standing up not fore [sic]
what works, but for what’s right. Fake news is just rhetoric linked to the epistemological
challenge of the human condition.
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